Karling klub Vukovi

On 28 December 2012, the Association of Serbian-Indonesian Friendship NUSANTARA in cooperation with the Belgrade City Library organized a lecture by Jovan Cavoski, Research Associate at the Institute for Recent History of Serbia and a PhD candidate at the University of Beijing.

The guests were greeted by H.E. Samuel Samson, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to Serbia, Jasmina Ninkov, Director of the Belgrade City Library and Aleksandar Rakovic, Chairman of the Association of Serbian-Indonesian Friendship “Nusantara”.

The lecture was attended by H.E. Abdelkader Mesdoua, Ambassador of Algeria and H.E. Zaw Tun, Ambassador of Myanmar, representatives of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, as well as the members of “Nusantara” Association and Serbia-China Friendship Association.

In a crowded hall of the Belgrade City Library, Ambassador Samson expressed his gratitude to Mr Cavoski for the idea of giving a lecture about the history of relations between Indonesia and Yugoslavia in Sukarno’s era. He said he was sure it would clarify “what happened in the past and help us choose the best way for the development of our bilateral relations and cooperation in the future.”

Ambassador also congratulated the Association of Serbian-Indonesian Friendship “Nusantara” led by Dr Aleksandar Rakovic, for organizing this lecture.

However, Mr Samson expressed regret because these excellent relations are now limited only to the field of politics. “My mission which started in 2011 aims to enhance the bilateral cooperation especially in the field of economy as well as in the field of military cooperation, culture, sport, tourism etc.”

According to H.E. Mr Samuel Samson, especially important is the fact that after so many years, Serbia and Indonesia are still close foreign political allies, especially regarding the “Kosovo issue”. “Indonesia also gives full attention and support to the process of Serbia’s integration into EU,” the Ambassador said.

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These facts, as stated by Mr Samson “are the basis for our optimism about the successful cooperation between Indonesia and Serbia. In this regard, I am truly confident, that there are no reasons we cannot achieve that same level of bilateral cooperation again.”

“I hope that Indonesia and Serbia will not remain just good friends but will become better and the closest partners, broaden and deepen partnership in the promotion of peace and prosperity, not only between our two countries and people, but also in our region and the world-wide,” Ambassador Samson said in conclusion.

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The lecture was the result of the author’s many years of research in international archives of Serbia, People’s Republic of China, India, Russia, and the United States about the rise of the global non-alignment and the special relationship of Indonesia with People’s Republic of China and Yugoslavia which was nurtured during the 50s and 60s of the twentieth century, as the reflection of the two dominant directions in the international activities of the Indonesian President Ahmed Sukarno.

In the opinion of Cavoski, Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China were the two countries symbolizing a dual direction of the international course of Sukarno’s Indonesia which wanted to play a prominent role, both among non-aligned countries and within a specific Afro-Asian community.

Tito’s Yugoslavia was one of its closest associates and allies in the effort to shape and promote the global role of so-called non-aligned world, while Mao’s China made significant efforts to strengthen political cooperation within the narrow framework of Afro-Asian world and thus define a new nature of international relations, which would be defined by the post-colonial world.

Tanjug news agency reported on this event.

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Jovan Cavoski, MSc

Institute for Recent History of Serbia

Sukarno between Mao and Tito: Indonesia, Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China 1955-1965

This lecture is the result of the author’s many years of research in the archives of Serbia, China, India, Russia, USA, Myanmar, etc.about the rise of the global nonalignment and the special relationship of Indonesia withPeople’s Republic of China and Yugoslavia which was nurtured during the 50s and 60s of the twentieth century.

These two countries symbolized a dual direction of international activitiesof Sukarno’s Indonesia, whichsought to playa prominent role, both among non-aligned and certain Afro-Asian countries. Tito’s Yugoslavia was one of its closest associates and allies in the effort to shape and promote the role of so-called global non-aligned world, whereas Mao’s China made significant effortsto strengthen political cooperation within the narrow context of Afro-Asian world and thus define a new nature of international relations, which would be defined by the post-colonial world.

Constantly moving between specific demands of global non-aligned policy and a desire to promote its own Afro-Asian identity after the Bandung Conference, Indonesia first turned towards Yugoslavia and the emerging Non-Aligned Movement, and then towards an attempt to create an alternative Afro-Asian movement with China and thus establish a global alternative to the great powers and non-aligned countries. Therefore, Indonesia’s special relationwith Yugoslavia and China represent a clear paradigm of President Sukarno’s foreign policy.

Speaking of the non-aligned countries, due to specific regional rivalry with India or hidden antagonism with Egypt over the Muslim population, Indonesia’s relationship with Yugoslavia became one of the closest that Jakarta had ever had within this group. In the period between 1956 and 1964Tito and Sukarno met at least nine times, which wasfar more frequently than the Indonesian President met with other world leaders. Both countries were seeking ways to improve international cooperation and overcome the limitations imposed by the Cold War,at the same time promoting an independent policy in the international arena that would act without the direct control of the great powers. Although it was officially denied, both Indonesia and Yugoslavia, each in its own way, encouraged the creation of a “third force” which was supposed tobe an alternative to the policy of the two superpowers.

On the other hand, during the 50s and early 60s, Indonesia and China developed a specificrevolutionary bond, creating a radical anti-imperialist alliance which significantly influencedthe relation of Jakarta with other key global players and, in many ways, shaped the Sukarno’s political destiny. Afro-Asiaand Indonesia in particular became a place where China would break the foreign policy isolation imposed by the United States, and promote its new global role, in accordance with Mao’s political strategy of creating a “united peace front” in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Thus, the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955 became not only a voice of post-colonial Afro-Asian community in relation to the two blocks, but also a stage where Beijing, presented in the character of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, would play a leading role among onceconquered nations. Although China had some reservations towards Indonesia due to its political, economic and military ties with Washington, China’s diplomacy was aware of the wider regional potentialand general importance of Jakarta.

SinceBandungfolloweda regional key where no difference was made between the bloc and non-bloc countries, and many countries, such as Yugoslavia, were not involved because of theirgeographical location overseas, they started looking for a new model of organizing the struggle for peace and equality. Tito, Nehru and Nasser were the three leaders who initiated the process of foreign policy coordination and close cooperation, establishing a new agenda that could be joinedby all the countries that did not belong to any block, as it was case with Sukarno. Sukarno visited Yugoslavia two months after Tito, Nehru and Nasser met on Brioni in July 1956 and was ready to join the initiative of the three leaders of the so-calledBrioni Declaration. Sukarno’s visit came after his official visits to the USA and the USSR which further emphasized its non-aligned character. During his visit he promoted the convening of a new Afro-Asian conference, this time on the issue of Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, but following Tito’s advice, he decided that a non-alignedgroup should become more engaged in the bodies of the UN. Sukarno informed his Yugoslav associatesthat he hadresistedpressures from Moscow to align with the Soviet bloc. Foreign Minister Subandrio underlined that the Soviets couldlearnmuch from Yugoslavia and Chinaabout building relations with Indonesia. Thus, Belgrade and Jakarta established a mechanism of close foreign policy coordination.

At the same time, Sukarno was trying to balance relations with Moscow by strengthening contacts with Beijing. In October 1956,Indonesian president made his first official visit to the People’s Republic of China and was very much impressed with the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, the speed of socialist development, political work with people and so on, all of which had a significant impact on the development of the Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” as a specific political model in Indonesia. On the other hand, China tried to win over all the options of Indonesian political spectrum. By the end of 1957 Vice President Mohamed Hata visited Beijing even though he had never been on good terms with the local communists. Thus, he showed good will toward Sukarno’s political allies tryingto win more of his confidence. Also, general circumstances were all in favour of China.

During 1957 and 1958Indonesia was going through a phase of political turmoil and military rebellion that plunged the country into even greater problems. Sukarno’s new political system created a lot of enemies among nationalist and Islamist forces, at the same time enjoying the undivided support of PKI and its leader Aidit. The fear that Indonesia could fall into the hands of the Communists, at both internal and external levels, as well as concern that the non-aligned course could undermine the position of the West in Southeast Asia, made USA undertake a covert operation and organize an armed rebellion on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi to overthrow Sukarno. This poorly planned move led to a further radicalization of Sukarno’s policy and strengthening of the position of the PKI in the Indonesian politics, while enabling faster approximation of Jakarta to China and the USSR. Thus, Indonesia remained determined to keep non-aligned course, but with a greater reliance on the East. At the same time, Beijing was greatly upset becauseIndonesian rebels got logistic support from Taiwan.

At that point, Yugoslavia found itself under a new ideological fire of Moscow and Beijing, which also affected Indonesia. Sukarno informed the Chinese and the Soviets that nothing would jeopardize his personal relationship and friendship with Tito. Socialists were even more upset by the fact that their anti-Yugoslav propaganda did not have much success among Asian and African leaders, except among Indonesian, Indian and Burmese communists. The Chinese were trying to make their struggle against Tito’s “revisionism” a priority in those years, which became obvious during Tito’s visit to Indonesia in December 1958 – January 1959, but Sukarno seriously warned PKI to refrain from major outages or be ready to suffer the consequences. His determination was also evident during the two meetings with Tito when he decided to promote the convening of a conference of non-aligned countries, which reflected Sukarno’s doubt in the policy of Moscow and Beijing.

Indonesian president wanted to be a mediator in the process of reconciliation betweenYugoslavia, China and the USSR, but he also wanted to avoid greater influence of the group to Indonesia’s internal affairs. Material support of the socialist countries was badly needed at the time, but not at the cost of losing political independence. Therefore, the measures were taken to intensify the political support to Sukarno’s policy, to further promote ties with non-aligned countries and maintain an equal distance in relation to both blocs. Thus, Indonesia decided to choose the Yugoslav port asthe point of entry of Indonesian goods for Europe, especially for Eastern Europe. Yugoslaviawas also asked to represent the interests of Indonesia in the conflict with the Netherlands over the colony of Western Irian. Jakarta turned to Yugoslavia and other allies to help its military modernization and thus resist Western pressures. Although the Soviet Union provided the largest military aid package of about a billion dollars, which gave Soviets a great influence in the Indonesian navy and army, Yugoslavia managed to be at the top of the countries that supported Indonesia in its fight to maintain independence. Yugoslavia provided a large amount of small arms, artillery, torpedo boats and landing crafts; in a very short period of time, Yugoslav military supplies reached the value of over 180 million dollars with a growing tendency. Just like other socialist countries, Yugoslavia provided loans that were supposed to ensure the economic stability of Indonesia (10 million dollars initially, and later on even more).

China helpedJakarta by providing military instructors and weapons (20 million dollars of weapon) and grants amounting to 36 million dollars. China’s state radio broadcast daily programs in support to the Indonesian struggle against Western subversive activities. Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi promised unconditional and full support to Indonesia, despite reservations Jakarta had always had. Beijing was convinced that Indonesia crossed the point of no return in its struggle against imperialism and that its central foreign policy course would gain its revolutionary colour in time. In this way, China fought against subversion of the USA in Taiwan by supporting Indonesia’s struggle against American interference.

However, in the period between 1959 and 1961 USSR and China found themselves in conflict with the leading non-aligned countries (Egypt and Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union and China, India with China and Indonesia with China). Taking advantage of China’s internal problemswhich originated from the failure of the “Great Leap Forward” economic program and the Chinese border conflict with India which weakened the position of China in Southeast Asia,in May 1959 certain circles in Jakarta decided to address the issue of the overseas Chinese and their large economic impact. This led to a serious crisis in the relations between Beijing and Jakarta, which resulted in the expulsion of diplomats and citizens of both countries, fierce debates among Chinese and Indonesian leaders, the repatriation of thousands of overseas Chinese and the freezing of mutual cooperation. Indonesia then decided to expand economic relations with some western countries (USA, West Germany, Japan, and Australia) in order to balance the increasing communist influence in the region. However, China was not ready to persist in confrontation that would lead to a complete breakdown of relations with Indonesia. Beijing was faced with tensions on the border with many of its neighbours, which were seen as the American effort to enclose China. Therefore, Marshal Chen Yi and other senior officials, suggested repatriation of overseas Chinese in order to remove obstacles to further cooperation with a friendly country.

During this period,major non-aligned countries improved their relations. Tito, Nasser and Sukarno were actively trying to formalize cooperation between their countries on the international stage, despite Nehru’s reserves. Ever since the Bandung Conference, Sukarno had been trying to convene a similar meeting where hewould play a leading role. Since the USA wereunwilling to give up their subversive activities, or to support Indonesia’s struggle against the Dutch and British colonial possessions in the region (West Irian and Malaysia), at the end of 1960 Sukarno decided to mobilize support among the non-aligned countries in order to normalize relations with China. Thus, he tried to get more international allies, while Beijing was aiming to reach an agreement with Sukarno, even my means of painful compromises, and so isolate those forces in Indonesia that opposed normalization. This was the reason whyPKI was transformed into a bastion of support for the Indonesian president. In fact, Sukarno had chosen a non-aligned course, relying on China which eventually resulted in his relations to other world actors. At the same time, he wanted to maintain the balance between Moscow and Beijing, skilfully manipulating their growing ideological conflict, in order to obtain the greatest possible financial support from both sides.

Indian diplomats were right when they noted that “Sukarno would like to be in Asia, what Titowas in Europe, and Nasser in the Middle East “, i.e. to become one of the pillars of the global non-alignment. Although Sukarno responded to the initiative of Tito and Nasser to convene a conference of non-aligned countries in 1961, he never abandoned his idea ofthe second Afro-Asian conference. In this respect, he enjoyed the full support of China, which had always favoured Afro-Asian conferencebecause, as a bloc country, it could not attend non-aligned conferences. Since Nehru, as theleader of the non-aligned, opposed a new conference, Tito and Nasser tried to win India, which led to a partial marginalization of Indonesia, despite Sukarno’s goodwill. AlthoughSukarno was no doubt one of the leading stars of the Belgrade conference, his ego could not stand to play a secondary role in relation to Tito, Nasser, and Nehru in particular. Belgrade Conference became a turning point after which Sukarno invested all his effortsin the organization of the Afro-Asian movement, through connecting with China and leading a radical anti-imperialist policy, which matched the policy of confrontation (konfrontasi) in connection with the independence of Malaysia in 1962.That was a time of “Conference conflict” which was supposed to bringa primacy to a non-aligned or Afro-Asian model. Although Sukarno participated in the Cairo Conference of non-aligned countries in October 1964, he endowed all his authority to the organization of the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria in late 1965.

Since the USSR pursued the policy of easing tension with the West, Moscow was not ready to go beyond economic and diplomatic support to Indonesia concerning the problem of Malaysia. Soviet rhetoric was strong, but it was primarily focused on strengthening the Soviet position in Indonesia against the United States and China, and avoiding further straining of relations in the region and creating new divisions. In this regard, Yugoslavia provided active support to the moderate position of Soviet diplomacy. On the other hand, China supported Indonesia’s non-alignment as a guarantee that Sukarno would not rely too much on Moscow or Washington. However, the ultimate goal of Chinese policy was to create a great anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist group which would include China, Indonesia, and most of developing countries, despite plans of superpowers and non-aligned countries (Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt). At that time, the number of Sukarno’s visits to his non-aligned friends decreased, while the number of meetings with significant Chinese officials increased, and PKI became the main support of the government.

Unlike other rivals, Beijing somehow managed to bring its declared policy into linewith the basic interests of Indonesia, Aidit being a guarantee of the stability of such a policy. Therefore, Jakarta concluded that China wascategorical in its efforts to defend the interests of Indonesia. Chinese rhetoric was consistent with Sukarno’s vision of a world divided in two parts (New Emerging Forces and Old Established Forces), while the efforts of Yugoslavia, India and the Soviet Union were seen as opportunistic. Thus, the Indonesian policy of “confrontation” and Chinese “shift to left” became powerful political allies. Although Sukarnoinformed the Yugoslav officials that he would maintain a balanced relationship with Beijing, under extreme circumstances, it wasvery difficult to pursue such a nuanced policy (PKI necessary support and radical rhetoric about Malaysia).

From the Yugoslav perspective, the preservation of Indonesian non-aligned position was crucial for the future of the non-aligned movement. Despite PKI ideological attacks on Yugoslavia, Tito decided to support Indonesia in the UN on the issue of Irian and Malaysia, in order to keep his old friend as a reliable ally. However, at the Cairo Conference when the two presidents had a sharp disagreement, Tito realized that Sukarnohad already been under the influence of Beijing. As can be seen from the archives, with the growth of China’s influence in Indonesia, the leading non-aligned countries and the Soviet Union turnedtheir back onSukarno, although itwas not officially proclaimed. Thus, a direct Indonesia’s support to China in its border conflict with India caused New Delhi to establish close relations with Malaysia, despite Indonesian protests. PKI described such a tendency as the result of a conspiracy between Belgrade and Moscow, with the support of India, against the new foreign policy of Jakarta.

There was no actual conspiracy, butdespite earlier disagreements,all these actors created a synergy of interests in relation to Indonesia. When in early 1965, after the accession of Malaysia, Indonesia decided to leave UN, Tito organized an international mediation to turn Sukarno away from this idea, but without success. Indonesia then decided to ask China for a considerable economic support worth several hundred million dollars, hencefirmly tying its political fate to Beijing. Beside the idea of organizing alternative Olympic Games, that was rejected by many non-aligned countries, both sides seriously considered the idea of creating an alternative international organization to replace the UN and assemble all the consistent anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces in the world. However, Sukarno had already come to the end of his political road.

Although even today, there are many controversies about the coup d’état of 30 September 1965 and the role of international actors, this event had led to radical changes in domestic and foreign policy of Indonesia, and eventually to Sukarno’s fall. The unsuccessful coup of Indonesian communists that led to the deaths of four Indonesian generalscaused a fierce counterattack of armed forces which sought for the complete destruction of all pro-Communist and pro-China forces in the country. Sukarno’s specific role hadnever been clarified, especially when it comes to the question whether it was his attempt to eliminatedisobedient generals and powerful Communists, but the events went out of control and led to the rise of General Suharto as the new leader. Nevertheless, the involvement of American intelligence in themilitary coupwas almost certain, and it probably served as a trigger for a precipitated communist coup. The role of Soviets is equally unclear, although one of the reasons for these events might have been a threat to Moscow to restrict military assistance. One thing is certain: none of the major actors, except for China, were interested in further Sukarno’s survival.

Despite numerous allegations ofthe involvement of China in the communist coup, the Chinese role cannot be reconstructed in detail, although it is very likely that China got involved later in order to save its own position after the failure of PKI. What ishowever certain is that these events led to the brutal interruption of Chinese influence in Indonesia, despite subsequent Sukarno’s secret mission ofMrsSupeni with the prince Sihanouk of Cambodia in February1966 to restore relations. The Indonesian army was no longer interested in close relations with Beijing. Events at the end of 1965 froze the Indonesian-Chinese relations for decades.

However, Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries were very much worried that the events in Indonesia would bring it closer to the West and make it completely leave its non-aligned policy. The adventurismof conflicting parties in Jakarta was threatening to undermine the interests of the non-aligned and socialist countries, and even thought about organizing a new left-wing which would keep a non-alignment course, and be politically close to Moscow, reducing the impact of the Indonesian army to the foreign policy. It was clear that one could no longer count on Sukarno. New Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik visited Yugoslavia, Egypt and Algeria in September 1966 and provided a solid guarantee that Indonesia would rebuild its role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and would not join any military alliance. He also engaged himself to increase the economic exchangeamong non-aligned countries andhelp Indonesia out of the economic crisis as soon as possible. They mostly relied on Yugoslavia as one of the few countries whose influence outlivedSukarno’s fall of 1967.

As we have seen from the previous discussions, Sukarno’s inability to play a key and leading role among the non-aligned countries, as well as the course towardsthe regional confrontation, left Indonesia without many old allies and with only one new that could not compensate for all prior international connections. Even if Sukarno had tried to return to a more neutral course with China, the Soviet Union and the United States, the unfortunate events in late 1965 beat him to it. A new phase in the Indonesian history began. Since then, Jakarta mostly concentrated on regional cooperation within ASEANand was committed to cooperation with non-aligned countries.

Basic biographical data:

Jovan Cavoski MSc is a Research Associate at the Institute for Recent History of Serbia. He is currently completing doctoral studies at the School of International Studies of Peking University, Department of History of international relations (thesis topic: “Between Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian world: China, Yugoslavia, and the struggle within the Third World 1954-1965”). He is also working on a doctorate in history at the Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade (thesis topic: “Yugoslavia, Burma and the Great Powers 1948-1963”). He finished basic studies in history in 2005 at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, where in 2007 he defended his master’s thesis entitled “Yugoslavia and the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959-1962,” which is 2009 was published by the Institute for Recent History of Serbia as a monograph. He is engaged in the research of the history of the Cold War, primarily in the Third World, the evolution of the Yugoslav non-aligned foreign policy, the emergence and development of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as the activities of the great powers, especially the People’s Republic of China and India. He took part at international conferences in Belgrade, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Santa Barbara, Hamburg, Moscow, Washington, Lisbon, Montreal, Jakarta, Palermo, etc. He also carried out studies and archival research in China, India, USA, Russia, Cuba, Myanmar, etc. Many of his papers were published in national and international journals and collections of papers.